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HAVE ANGELS DONE MORE?
The Steel Industry ConsentDecree
ABSTRACT
This study analyzes the ConsentDecree of the United States'basic
steel industry which reformedplant seniority systems toaccomodate issues
of equal employmentopportunity. The plant—by—plant litigationbrought
under Title VII and Executive
Order 11246 is shown to be themain catalyst
which brought representatives ofthe steel industry, of theUnited Steel
Workers of America, and of the
appropriate government agencies tonegotiate
this industry_wide solution.The principal terms of thesteel industry
Consent Decree are: theestablishment of a mechanism toimplement the
Decree; the uniform institution of
plant—wide seniority; the retentionof
pay rates after transfer to a positionthat provides a lowerpay rate than
the previous position; theestablishment of goals forminority representa-
tion in trade and craftjobs; and a back pay settlement.The analysis of
these provisions reveals tworelated points. Blackrepresentation in trade
and craft jobs increased inthe four year period after theDecree, with an
indication that the increasewas greater than pre—1974employment trends
would have predicted.
flowever, 1978 black/white employmentfigures indicate
that underutilization of blacksin these positions stillpersists.
Casey Ichniowski
National Bureau of EconomicResearch, Inc.
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
(617) 868—3912The production workforce in the basicsteel industry totaled
530,000 employees in 1974, so that when,on April 15, 1974, the United
Steelworkers of America and ninecompanies in the industry entered into'a
Consent Decree with the United Statesas represented by the Attorney
General's Office, the Department ofJustice, the Secretary of Labor, the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance(OFCC), and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the employmentpractices of a key segment of
the United States manufacturing sectorwere affected. The nature of' the
basic steel industry, the nature of theactors involved, the historical
relationship of these principal actors, the economicclimate and general
timing of the negotiations are factors specificto the case of the Steel
Consent Decree that helped to determine theunique process and outcome
embodied in the Decree.
Consent decrees had been emerging since thetime of the American
Telephone and Telegraph Consent Decree as a method forparties to form the
substance and implementation mechanisms of theequal employment opportunity
policies with which they would live. Manyconsent decrees, particularly
those involving white—collar jobs, werenegotiated in settings without
unions. In cases in which employee organizationswere present, their
role tended to be limited. In the steelcase, not only was the United
Steelworkers of America (USWA) a principalactor, but it instigated the
process. The USWA was also a union operating in a
multiemployer setting.
The relationship between the USWA and thearray of employers had reached
a stage of maturity in which collective bargainingwas being governed
for the first time by the ExperimentalNegotiating Agreement (ENA). The
negotiations of the Decree coincided with the initial ENAcollective bar-
gaining negotiations. Furthermore, through the earlyl970s, the steel
industry was a contracting industry hard pressed by increased—2—
competition from imports, by a general economic recession, and by the com--
pounding problems of extensive new capital investment to modernize the
domestic steel production process. All such environmental factors which
helped to determine the process, as well as the outcome, of the Decree
deserve attention in an analysis of the steel industry's consent decree.
Moreover, employment policies in this key manufacturing sector impact on
other sectors, so that an analysis of the Decree should be mindful of such
spillovers.
Specifically, this paper is divided into four sections. Section I
describes the setting in which the actors caine to negotiate the Decree.
This section will consider the following categories of environmental fac-
tors: the demographics of employment, the economic environment of the indus-
try, the environment described by pre—existing litigation, and other poli-
tical and positioning considerations of the parties. Section II describes
the principal terms and features of the Consent Decree. For the substantive
features of the Decree, there is an analysis of the impact of each feature
on employment outcomes in the steel industry in Section III. In the final
section, broader impacts of the Steel Consent Decree are indicated ——
specificallythe spillover of the Steel Decree's terms to the aluminum
industry.— 3—
I. The Setting for Negotiations
p1oyment Trends in Basic Steel
Onefactor shaping the perceptions ofemployer and employee repre-
sentatives in the period leadingup to the formulation of the Consent
Decree was the size and distribution of the minority
workforce within the
steel industry's total workforce. Thelarger the percentage of minorities,
and the more unequal the distribution ofminorities between positiOns
affording different economic opportunities, thegreater the effort one
would expect from the minorities within theUSWA to move the union to ad-
dress the issues of equal employmentopportunity. In this section, such
employment trends in the steel industry areconsidered for the decade
preceeding the Consent Decree.
Table 1 presents employment changes in thesteel industry workforce
form 1966—74.In 1966, one observes the basicpattern of employment that
the Consent Decree would ultimately bedesigned to change. Out of a work—
force of 798,556 employees, 14.26% or113,860 were black. This black
workforce was heavily concentrated in blue—collaroccupations, and within
the blue—collar occupations, blackemployees show a higher representation
in lower skilled jobs. Of all craftsmen in1966, 6.31% were black, as com-
pared to 20.28% of all operatives and 28.19% of allunskilled laborers.
However, the trends over the next eightyears, presented in Table 1,
do not show movement toward greaterinequality in this employment distri-
bution. Industry employment fluctuatedover this eight year period with an
overall downward trend. Within thisrelatively unstable employment frame-
work, black representat ion in all majoroccupational categories is very
stable. Black employment in the industry increasesslightly from 14.26%
in 1966 to 14.82% in 1974, while totalemployment fell from 798,556 to—4—
TkBLE 1
BLACK EMPLOYMENT IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY BY OCCUPATION AND YEAR
PERCENT BLACK


























































































Industry Total 14.2615.60 15.2314.7014.4114.5314.82
Source: EEO—1 Forms, 1966, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974 for SIC
Industry #331, Blast Furnance and Basic Steel and SIC Industry
#332, Iron and Steel Foundries.—5—
699,245 over the same period. Blackrepresentation in white—collar jobs
shows modest increases through theperiod, while in blue—collar Positions
there is little fluctuation. Throughout
this time, blacks are relatively
underrepresented in white—collar jobs and in tradeand craft jobs within
blue—collar occupations. Despite a slightupward trend in black represen-
tation in trade and craft Positions, in1974, the year of the Consent De-
cree, black representation in these positions isonly 42% of their repre-
sentation in the blue—collar workforce.
Although one does not observe any trend toward
greater inequality
in the occupational distribution by raceover these eight years, the pat-
tern of underrepresentatjon of blacks in trade andcraft and white—collar
occupations persisted over time. The persistence of thispattern formed
the basis for complaints in litigation in thesteel industry that ultimate—
ly brought on the negotiations over ConsentDecree I which governed the
distribution of minorities across production andmaintenance occupations
and Consent Decree II which addressed the issue of
minority employment
opportunities in white—collar jobs.
The Economic Environment of the SteelIndustry
Even with gains in industry employment in 1973and 1974, employment
in basic steel decreases by nearly 100,000employees from 1966 to the year
of the Consent Decree. This generalemployment decline is consistent with
the decline in the competitive position ofthe United States basic steel
industry. Such a position would reinforce thecompanies' interest in a—
voiding costly settlements of discrimination charges.Furthermore, an
effective remedy of the inequality ofemployment opportunity would neces-
sarily have to consider any business contraction whichwould translate into
contracting employment.—6—
Figures presented in Table 2 describe business trends in the steel
industry in the period prior to the Consent Decree. From 1960 to 1970,
1/
profits as a percent of sales declined steadily from 5.8% to 2.6%, with
increases in profitability in 1973 and 1974. Comparatively modern
steel production processes abroad also hurt the competitve position of the
United States steel industry in the world market. Steel imports increased
steadily over the decade, accounting for 4.7% of domestic consumption in
2/
1960. In 1968, the percentage had increased to 16.7%.
Furthermore, the problems confronting the steel industry during the
business contraction of the early 1970s were compounded by extensive capital
investment projects to replace obsolete and energy inefficient production
equipment. In 1970, $1.73 billion of new capital investment was undertaken
3/ 4/
in the basic steel industry. In 1975, the figure was $3.71 billion.
Imports of steel and industry employment and profitability point con-
sistently to contraction in the basic steel industry through the 1960s and
early 1970s. However, statistics for 1973 and 1974 just as consistently in-
dicate expansion of the industry. The protracted period of contraction may
well have been a factor that heightened industry's interest to avoid costly
litigious proceedings concerning employment opportunity in the industry, yet
the 1973—74 upturn in the industry may have presented negotiators of the
Decree with brighter prospects for the industry. One representative of
the USWA familiar with the negotiation of the Steel Consent Decree felt that
the long—term declining position of the industry was not an important or
5/
explicit consideration in the negotiation of the Decree.The improving
position of the industry in 1973 and 1974 may have partly been responsible
for this perspective, yet a mechanism that would effectively address the
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recognized long—term industry contraction and the accompanying employment
contraction which basic steel was to face through the remainder of the
1970s. The Decree's design and its effectiveness in light of this indus-
try situation are discussed in the following sections.
A Background of Litigation
The environment as described by the employment and industry trends
set the framework within which the USWA, the steel companies and the govern-
ment would operate. More specifically, it was the litigation brought under
I
TitleVII and Executive Order 11246 which provided the catalyst that brought
the parties to negotiate over the industry's basic seniority/employment
opportunity practices. The steel industry had been confronted with issues
concerning the possible discriminatory effects of seniority systems in place
at various plants in several cases over a long history. The decisions on
this issue are divided into two distinct groups by the Second Court of Appeals
decision in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation (Lackawanna Plant)
in June 1971. The set of decisions prior to this appeals court deci-
sion did not provide for any seniority "carryover" or "rate retention" and
generally did not threaten any plant's seniority system. These decisions
include itfie1d v. United Steelworkers of America, Local 2708 (l958);6/
Federal District Court decisions in United States v. H.K. Porter (l968)'
and the United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation (Lackawanna Plant)
(1970);8I and In the Matter of Bethlehem Steel CorDoration (Sparrows Point
Plant) OFCC Docket #102—68 (1970), The second set of cases reversed
the trend set by the early decisions, and threatened seniority systems
in place by providing for remedies of rate retention and seniority
carryover generally for the affected class of minority employees. These—9—
cases include the Court of Appeals decision in United Statesv, Bethlehem
Steel Corporation (Lackawanna Plant) (1971),lO/ In the Matterof Bethlehem
Steel Corporation (Sparrows Point Plant) (l973),l and theDistrict Court
decision in United States V.UnitedStates Steel Corporation (Fairfield
Plant) (1973).12/
The first case to address the possible inequalities inherentin a
steel seniority system was Whitfield v. United Steel Workers ofAmerica,
Local 2708 (1958). Before the Fifth Circuit prior to Title VII in1958,
the court left the seniority system at the Arnico Steel Corporation'splant
in Houston, Texas unaltered, stating that when ".. .a largecompany substi-
tutes a program of equal job opportunity for previous discriminatory
practices.. .it is impossible to place Negro incumbents holding certainjobs,
especially unskilled jobs, on absolutely equal footing with white incumbents
in skilled jobs." The court ..attach{edjparticular importance to the
good faith effort of the parties in working toward a fair solution.. .The
Union and the Company. . .have a contract that from now on is free fromany
discrimination based on race. Angels could do no more. As this
language indicates, the Whitfield opinion focusses on how fairly thecom-
pany and union represent the interests of minority employees. Court
opinions for cases heard after the enactment of Title VII would
require language that would encompass both the duty of fair representation
and the provisions of the equal opportunity legislation.
Following Whitfield is the array of cases brought under Title VII
and Executive Order 11246. The case responsible for the first decision
under this legislation on these seniority—based issues was United States
v. H.K. Porter Company (1968) heard in the northern district of Alabama.
Despite the fact that the departmental seniority system in Porter helped— 10—
to maintain inequalities in the racial compositions of departments, the
trial court rejected the government's arguments for a remedy of the
institution of a plant—wide seniority system. Rather, the court found that
skills, training, and hazards differed significantly from job—to—job, and
it would therefore be inappropriate to assume:
that the employees in this steel mill are in no danger
of injury from the performance of the jobs around them
by14, employees with less than the full amount of experience...
As the appeals process began in Porter, United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corporation (Lackawanna Plant) (1970) was brought under Title VII in
the western district of New York and a hearing panel was established In The
Matter of Bethlehem Steel Corporation (Sparrows Point Plant) (1970) under
Executive Order 11246. Both cases involved larger steel plants than in
the Porter case (1968), and thereby were more typical of steel mill opera-
tions. In the Lackawanna (1970) case, the government again sought a
revamping of a department—wide seniority system which helped maintain a
system in which 83% of all black employees were concentrated in eleven of
the company's eighty—two departmentsl5/ by allowing blacks employed in
these eleven departments to transfer with rate retention and without loss
of seniority privileges.
The trial court rejected the government's argument here as well.
Among the reasons for the court upholding the department—wide system were:
(1) that the eleven departments in question were by no means
exclusively black departments, with two—thirds of the employees white;
(2) that the earnings of blacks in these departments were 96.7%
of the average hourly earnings of all plant employees, despite greater
seniority of white employees throughout the plant;
(3) that these eleven departments provided more stable employment—11—
subject to fewer cyclical layoffs;
(4) that the level of transfers was significantunder the existing
seniority system without rate retention andcarryover;
(5) that the company had in place a system tocure the racial
imbalance in representation in departments;
(6) and that the government's remedy was fraughtwith potential dis—
ruptive effects on incentive pay programs, the job classificationscheme,
and expectations for promotion of employees outsidethe "affected' class.161
The affirmation of the department—basedseniority system was miti-
gated by the trial court's granting of preferential transferrights to
employees (white as well as black) in the eleven departmentsbased on plant
seniority, but without rate retention or senioritycarryover•
Following on the Lackawanna (1970) decision, ahearing panel for the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance'scase, In the Matter of Bethlehem
Steel Corporation (Sparrows Point Plant) (1970) followedthe trend of the
previous cases, rejecting the need for any remedies, much lessremedies with
rate retention or carryover. The decision of thehearing panel stressed, in
much the same fashion as did the trial court in Porter(1968), the business
necessity for the existing system in the steel industrysetting.
The decisions consistently left in place thedepartment—wide senior-
ity systems in each case. As the appeal process continued forthis set of
cases, the consistent trend of the trial courts and the OFCCcase hearing
panel would be reversed. In June of 1971, the Second CircuitCourt of Ap-
peals reversed both the trial court in Lackawanna (1970) and thetrend of
decisions on such seniority issues. The fact -that thedepartmental segrega-
tion did not impact greatly on earnings did not convincethe Second Circuit
that the affected class of minorities should thereforenot be given special—12—
consideration in future transfers. As for the effect on promotion expecta-
tions of those in the non—affected class, the appeals court posited that
those "hopes arise from an illegal system," and further that "if relief
under Title VII can be denied merely because the majority group of employees,
who have not suffered discrimination, will be unhappy about it, there is
little hope of correcting the wrongs to which the Act is directed.l7/
The Appeals Court felt the trial court "put it backwards" in denying relief
because the existing system did not deter all transfers. The criterion of
the Appeals Court was "what would be necessary to insure sufficient incen-
tive to transfer so that the effects of past discrimination could not be
perpetuated.
,,181
In connection with this line of argument, the Second Circuit granted
seniority carryover and rate retention for members of the affected class and
removed the special transfer privileges of white employees in the eleven
departments. The "black only" or affected class only approach was to be
a strong catalyst in moving the USWA to adopt the Consent Decree approach
of addressing these issues.
In Januray of 1973, after review of the hearing panel's recoinmen—
dations, the Secretary of Labor, James Hodgson, ignored the panel's recom-
mendations in his decision on Sparrows Point, OFCC Docket #102—68. Secre-
tary Hodgson "framed a remedy which is consistent with the evidence and the
relevant court decisions, particularly relying on the Second Circuit Court
19 /
ofAppeals in United States v. Bethlehem."
As the trend in decisions was being reversed, a case involving the
seniority system of the large Fairfield plant of the United States Steel
Corporation was pending in the northern district of Alabama. Wishing to
settle Fairfield out of court, the USWA and the government representatives—13—
urged the Fifth Circuit to deliver a decision on the appeal of Porter (1968),
still awaiting a hearing. A Fairfield settlement could then be reached
20/ based on the guidelines that the Fifth Circuit would prescribe in Porter.
No decision was forthcoming, and so the Fairfield case was heard in the
northern district of Alabama over several months in 1973, "with more than
10,000 pages of testimony, and over ten feet of stipulations and exhibit."2
Judge Pointer's decision would form the basis of the substance eventually
embodied in the Steel Consent Decree.
Pointer's decision partially adopted the government's request for
a remedy involving rate retention and carryover. But seeking an "even-
handed" approach, the provision that plant seniority would govern promo-
tions, layoffs, and other areas would apply to all employees in the plant.
Rate retention applied to those minorities that were included within the
definition of affected Fairfield employees. Pointer's decision was the
last deicison to have a significant impact on the seniority discrimination
issue. The decision in the Porter (1968) appeal would be based upon a
stipulation of the parties in 1974.
Other Positioning Considerations
With the trend in key cases modifying seniority systems with "black—
only" remedies, and with the Fairfield decision presenting a middle—ground
remedy, potential benefits of negotiation of the Consent Decree now existed.
In review of the development of this environment conducive to negotiation,
three specific factors moved the USWA to promote negotiation. The trend
in decisions toward remedies providing for black only modifications to
seniority systems, the USWA felt, would create undesirable fragmentation
within their membership, and other disruptions at the plant level. Second,—14—
the USWA had advocated plant—wide seniority for some time, but left the
determination of the system to the discretion of locally autonomous bar-
gaining. Finally, the cases that were being decided werebut a fraction
of all cases involving seniority and equal employment opportunity in basic
steel. According to one company representative, the ability of the com-
panies, the USWA, and the government representatives toavoid the
escalating costs associated with a plant—by—plant approach to seniority
remedies was the principal factor which motivated these parties to adopt
an industry—widesolution.22/
Beyond these specific reasons that made the time right for the
Consent Decree, the declining condition of the industry was a broader
environmental factor that made it more desirable to avoid court cases and
settlements that would be costly to the industry. This was particularly
important, since, even after Fairfield, industry representatives felt
they could win appeals of the decisions and win decisions in upcoming cases
23/
on grounds of "business necessity," as in the H.K. Porter case of 1968.
Industry conditions would not allow the company representatives the lux-
ury of overlooking less costly approaches to the issue.Also pointed out,
the general employment picture did not indicate any easing of the problems
as blacks, from 1963 to 1974, were still by and large segregated out of
trade and craft occupations.
One final consideration in the development of the environment
necessary to allow negotiation of the Consent Decree was the well—developed
bargaining relationship of the USWA and industry representatives. In 1974,
the basic collective bargaining agreement was expiring and to be replaced
by a successor agreement negotiated for the first time under the Experi-
mental Negotiating Agreement (ENA). Parties had planned on taking advan——15—
tage of the opportunity of memorializing the negotiated settlementof the
seniority/employment opportunity issues in the collectivebargaining agree-
ment. Once it was decided to include the result of thesenegotiations in
the collective bargaining agreement, timing of ENAnegotiations put pres-
sure on the parties to reach agreement by the expiration date ofthe
previous collective bargaining agreement. If issues on the ConsentDecre
were left unresolved, the parties were fearful that such issueswould be
24/
subject to the decision of a third party arbitrator,since under the
ENA any issue of successor collective bargainingagreement unresolved by
the bargaining deadline was to be decided by an arbitrator.Furthermore,
the USWA Executive Board felt the seniority issues could even threaten
the ENA procedure itself:
It would be unwise to subject that negotiating procedure
[ENA] to the stress of reforming seniority. The success
of the new procedure will depend heavily upon the effec-
tiveness with which it meets our [USWA's] members needs
in 1974. If the seniority issue were to be handled under
the new procedure, the resulting tensions could seriously
threaten the ENA. 25/
The economic and employment settings in the basic steelindustry
came together with the trend of legal decisions on seniority systems' dis-
criminatory impact in such a way that it was of mutual interest to the USWA,
the steel companies, and government representatives to negotiatean industry—
wide solution to the problem. Pressure to address the issuewas also brought
to bear on the negotiations by the bargaining deadline of the industry's col-
lective bargaining agreement.
II. The Provisions of the Consent Decree ——ConsentDecree I
Once parties decided to address the seniority system and discrimin-
ation issues in negotiation, the remedies focused on a concept that had—16—
been inherent in debates on civil rights issues since the late l950s,
the concept of "rightful place." Under this doctrine, the remedy devised
would have to concern itself with the fact that seniority systems in plants
throughout the industry had denied blacks and other minorities their right-
ful place in terms of occupation, earnings and future job opportunities.
This doctrine can be applied in two ways. Retrospectively, how would a
remedy address the fact that minorities had been denied their rightful place
over past years and thereby been on lower earning paths for a significant
part of their careers? Prospectively, how would the Consent Decree alter
the seniority provisions in plants across the country to permit minorities
to reach their rightful occupational and earnings levels. This section
describes the remedies prescribed for the steel industry in Consent Decree
I; that is, the part of the Consent Decree package that considered the
situation of the production and maintenance workforce in basic steel (Consent
Decree II will not be directly addressed in this discussion, as the negotia-
tion of Decree II did not involve the USWA. Decree II altered employment
practices in white—collar positions and in hiring practices. Generally,
Decreee II, formulated after Decree I had been settled, followed the outline
of Decree I in form and substance.)More specifically, the basic features
of Consent Decree I were: the establishment of a mechanism to implement the
Decree; the uniform institution of plant—wide seniority; the particular
application of plant continuous service for transfer opportunities; the
retention of pay rates, or "red circling't when transferring if the new
positions's rate of pay was lower than the rate at the former position;
the establishment of trade and craft goals for minority representation;
and a back pay settlement. For the provisions which altered employment
practices and relationships among employees, the impact of the provision—17-
in the first four years of the Decree, from 1974—78,will be analyzed in
Section III.
The Implementation Mechanism
Because of the familiarity with the steelindustry achieved by
Judge Pointer from the lengthy Fairfield hearing, thegovernment asked
Pointer to be the judge to enter the Consent Decree. Thefirst of three
levels of the mechanism for implementing the Decreewas thereby estab-
lished. The District Court of Northern Alabama would maintainjurisdic-
tion over the Decree, its substance as well asimplementation, for a
period of at least five years from the date of the Decree.
At a second level, and coordinating the implementationactivity at
all plants covered by the Decree, is the Audit and ReviewCommittee. The
A&R Committee was a continuation of the SeniorityStudy Committee of the
Coordinating Committee of Steel Companies and the United Steelworkers of
America. To this Seniority Study Committee thegovernment added a repre-
sentative to form the A&R Committee. The Decree setsout four broad
responsibilities for the A&R Committee:
(1) oversee the implementation of and compliance with theConsent
Decree at the plant level;
(2) take up the resolution matters that remain indispute at the
plant level;
(3) begin a review of the experience under the Decreeno later
than December 31, 1975 with regard to transferopportunities and records,
achievement of trade and craft goals, and relatedmatters;
(4) bring to the District Court any issue which it isunable to
26/
resolve or clarify on its owii.—18—
The lowest tier of the mechanism is occupied byplant—levelImple—
mentation Committees. The role of these committees a defined in the
Decree is to:
(1) take the functional steps necessary to assure compliance with
trade and craft goals, timetables, and implementation ratios;
(2) provide information to plant employees;
(3) consider grievances which are Decree related' (other grie-
vances are to be handled by the pre—existing grievance machinery);
(4) be available to employees at convenienthours.27/
This self—enforcing monitoring mechanism benefits from the knowledge and
experience of the TJSWA and the companies with these issues. Furthermore,
the provision for evaluation built a legitimizing influence into the
process.
The Institution of Plant—Wide Seniority
At the heart of the Decree is Section 4(a) which provides in part:
plant continuous service. .. shallbe used.., for all
purposes in which a measure of continuous service
is presently being utilized [under the contract.] 28/
Plant service date would be the ruling criterion in selection of employees
for promotion, transfer, layoff and recall. Furthermore, in contracts
which provide for use of seniority in such matters as vacation selection,
overtime allocation, and shift scheduling, plant continuous service governs
the selection. This section specifically forbids "leap—frogging or a
reshuffling of the relative positions of employees at the time of the Decree;
rather it is a prospective remedy applying to future job vacancies or
closings. As the Consent Decree is further described, the experience under
the first four years of the Decree will be analyzed in considering the effec——19—
tiveness of this prospective remedy, particularly in the area oftransfers
and the achievement of equality in minority representation in tradeand
craft positions.
Trans fers
An important distinction to be made on the transferaccording tr
plantservice aspects of the remedy is that the Consent Decree doesnot
alter lines of progression within departmental units. In thisway, a
permanent vacancy within a department will be filled from below within a
department. Once employees fill the chain of vacancies within a depart-
ment, an entry level vacancy occurs. This resultant opening is then
filled on the basis of plant Continuous service. Topromote transfer
within these limitations, the Decree provides for criteriagoverning dis-
tribution of the information Concerning job openings, for theavailability
of training opportunities, and for a forty—fiveday trial period during
which an employee who transfersmay return to his old position.
Rate Retention
The notion of rate retention is a feature of theDecree intended
to promote transfers. Any employee whose plant service datepredates
January 1, 1968, whether the employee is a member of the "affectedclass"
or not, will receive upon transfer the rate of thenew job or the rate of
his previous position (based on anaverage of pay rates from the last sev-
eral pay periods prior to transfer) whichever isgreater. The rate re-
tention feature applies for a two year period, with eacheligible employee
allowed two transfers with rate retention.—20—
Trade and Craft Goals
The Audit and Review Committee is instructed to carry Out an analysis
of the utilization of blacks and other minorities in trade and craft occu-
pations in plants covered by the Consent Decree. This analysis is to identi-
fy whether minorities are underutilized in various groups of trade and craft
occupations. Where it is identified that "underutilization" exists, goals
and timetables are to be formulated to move employment toward the standards
developed in the Decree. A fifty percent implementation rate is established
by the Decree, so that where underutilization exists, one—half of entry
level vacancies which occur are to be made available to minorities. Under-
utilization is generally decided on the goal of having minority representa-
tion in trade and craft positions equal to the minority representations in
the plant as a whole.
Back Pay
The above provisions of Consent Decree I are primarily forward
looking, addressing the prospective "rightful place" notion; that is, how
were minorities to be given the, opportunity to attain a representative po-
sition within the economic system of the basic steel industry. However,
inherent in the forward looking remedies is the understanding that minori-
ties had been denied their rightful place in that system for past years
due to a seniority system which locked employees into relative positions
determined partially by past discrimination. The back pay provision of
Consent Decree I specifically recognizes the past discrimination and the
loss of economic opportunity due to that discrimination. Negotiations led
to the establishement of a $35 million fund from which "affected class em-
ployees" would be able to claim back pay. However, toward the end of the—21—
process, the Inland Steel Company withdrew from thenegotiations and final
settlement to reduce the total number ofcompanies involved from ten to
nine. Since Inland is basically a single
plant company it may not have
benefited as much as other companies froma solution designed to avoid
plant—by—plant remedies. The $35 million fundwas reduced in proportion
to estimates of Inland's share of Taffected class"employees to a new total
of $30,940,000. The minimumpayment a claiming employee could receive
would be $250, with the actual amount determinedby a formula based on
minority/non_minority earning differentials and factorsrelated to length
of service. An important feature of the backpay provision is that for an
employee to claim back pay it was "required [thathe] sign a release
relieving the USWA and the company from all claimsarising out of pre—
Decree acts,' including existing Title VIIor Executive Order 11246
29 / cases.
III. Living with the Consent Decree ——AnAnalysis of Impact
All of the provisions of Consent Decree Icome together with the
stagnant economic environment of the steelindustry of the mid—1970s to
create a particular set of incentives andopportunities for production
and maintenance (P&M) employees in theindustry. This specific set of in-
centives and opportunities determine howquickly the industry would realize
the employment goals of theDecree, if at all. In this section, theexperi-
ence of the industry in changing employment
patterns, specific resolutions of
back pay issues, and other issuesrelated to Consent Decree Iare anlyzed.
Minority Representation in Trade and CraftOccupations
At the center of the Decree as well
as the prior litigation was the—2 2—
underrepresentation of minorities in trade and craft positions in the indus-
try. Here, the changing patterns of representation of the black workforce
in trade and craft positions is analyzed. The method for theanalysis is
based on the Chi—square test. For 103 plants in 1974 and 124 plants in1978,
data on the number of blacks and non—blacks in trade and craftpositions and
non—trade and craft positions are compared to the expected number of blacks
and non—blacks in those positions. The expected number is calculated basedon
the Decree's goal that minorities should be represented in trade andcraft
positions in the same proportion as their representation in the plantas a
whole. In addition to the Chi—square analysis, the deviation of theexpec-
ted number of blacks in trade and craft positions from the actual numberis
30 /
calculated. This deviation is standardized according to the binomial
standard deviation formula,NP(l—P), where:
N =totalnumber of black and white
trade and craft employees,
Ppercentage of all black and white
production and maintenance emplo-
yees that are black.
Before results of the analysis are presented, certain factors inher-
ent in the employment situation should be noted. Since expected represen-
tation figures are based on current percentages of minorities within plants,
it will become more (less) difficult for a given plant to realize the goal of
equal representation in trade and craft positions should minorities gain
(lose) in plant—wide representation from 1974 to 1978. Table 3 illustrates
this point. Although industry totals show a very stable minority represen-
tation in the P&M workforce with an increase of 0.41 percentage points in
minority representation, plants of certain companies show more marked changes.
Specifically, certain plants of the Armco Steel Corporation are expected to—23—
TABLE3
ENJLOYMENT CHANGES FROM 1974 TO 1978BY COMPANY
EmploymentTotals
Company —AllEmployees Percent Black —BlackEmployees
Allegheny-Ludlun -2,155 (7,447 to 5,292)
Industries - 91 (317 to 226) + .01 (4.26 to 4.2r7)
ArmcoSteel + 2,897 (10,992 to 13,889)
Corporation +1,083 (1,029 to 2,112) +5.85 (9.36 to 15.21)
Bethlehem Steel -17,585 (65,835 to 48,250)
+ .42 (16.25 to 16.67) Corporation -2,656(10,700 to 8,044)
Jones & Laughlin + 596 (21,286 to 21,882)
Steel Corporation —366 (3,173 to 2,807) —2.08 (14.91 to 12.83)
National Steel -114(12,347 to 12,233)
Corporation —370 (2,213 to 1,843) —2.85 (17.92 to 15.07)
Republic Steel + 1,281 (27,429 to 28.710)
Corporation + 39 (5,488 to 5,527)
—.76(20.01 to 19.25)
United States +6,214(79,729 to 85,943)
+.41(18.34 to 18.75) Steel Corporation + 1,491 (14,623 to 16,114)
Wheeling—Pittsburgh—5,021(14,559 to 9,538)
Steel Corporation —196 (691 to 495) + .44 (4.75 to 5.19)
Youngstown Sheet & —4,037(18,654 to 14,617) —.02(21.37 to 21.35) Tube Company —867 (3,987 to 3,120)
Industry Totals —17,924 (258,278 to 240,354)
+.41(16.35 to 16.76) —1,933(42,221 to 40,288)
Source: Audit and Review Committee, "Reporton Minority and Female Employee
Utilization," Appendices A and C, for sample ofplants reporting in both 1974 and 1978.24—
have a more difficult task in equalizing representation in trade and craft
jobs as minority representation at Armco plants increased 5.85%. The
opposite is expected to hold for the Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation
and the National Steel Corporation.
Summary statistics indicate the general situation in regards to black
representation in the steel industry. In 1974, in 106 plants blacks held
3824 of the 42,221 trade and craft positions. Basedon the proportion of
blacks in the total P&M workforce, blacks would have beenexpected to hold
10,163 of these craft jobs. This deviation is represented bya Chi—square
statistic of 6223.1, significant at well above the .001level, while the
expected black representation in craft jobs is 68.75 standard deviationsoff
the acutal. (The size of this industry—wide deviation shouldbe thought of
as a curnmulative account, not an average of underutilization in individual
plants.)
The 1978 figures show movement toward equalizing thedistributions of
black employees across the P&N workforce; however, theinequality is still
very evident. Blacks held 4949 of the 40,348 craft positions, whereas they
were expected to hold 10,215 of these positions. This fact is sunutarized by
a Chi—square statistic of 4358.9, while the actual number of blacks in trade
and craft jobs is a slightly lower but still significant 57.08 standard devia-
tions from the expected.
Aside from asking whether Consent Decree I realized the goal of
equalizing the racial composition across blue—collar occupations, a different
question in gauging the industry impact of Consent Decree I is: to what de-
gree is the employment distribution in trade and craft positions different
from what it would have been in the absence of the Decree? Ideally, one would
apply characteristics of individual employees at each plant to seniority rules



























All projected trends fallshort of theactualincreases in bldk
representationin trade and craft jobs from1975 to 1978. From theactual
employment trend it appears that
the Consent Decree had itslargest impact
from 1974 to 1975. Due to thelack of data from EE0—lforms for 1976 and
1977, annual changes in minority
representation cannot be trackedfrom
1975 to 1978. However, the
average annual increase over thisthree year
period is comparable to the
average increases yielded by the threeprojec—
tions. The projections yield the
following average percentagepoint increases
for 1975 to 1978
respectively: 0.27%, 0.18%, 0.15%, whilethe actual increase
after 1975 in blackrepresentation is 0.23%.
Industry data from the A&R Committeeand from EEO—l Forms showmove-
ment toward equality in the racialcomposition of blue—collar workforcea—
cross occupational categories, with
some evidence supporting the claimthat
this movement was more rapid thanit might have been in theabsence of
Consent Decree I. Although themovement is toward equality, theracial dis-
tribution in 1978 is one ofinequality. These two facts are alsoevident
in the analysis of dataon the plant level. Figure 2 showsthe distribution
of standard deviations ofexpeced black representation incraft jobs from
actual for the plants in 1974and 1978. A plant in whichblacks are repre-
sented in trade and craftpositions in the exact
proportion as they are in
that plant's total P&Mworkforce will be representedby a standard deviation
of zero in the distribution.
Any plant in which theeected number of
blacks in craft jobs isgreater than the actual number willbe represented
by a positive standard deviation.
From inspection of the 1974distribution the underutilizationof
blacks in plants is
immediately obvious. Virtually all ofthe 103 plants
show an underutilization of








































































































































1.645 indicates a deviation ofexpected from actual representation thatis
significant at the .05 level. For 1974, themean of the deviations is 5.07,
the median is 3.12. Approximately 82% of theplants have significant devi-
ations from expected representations.
For 1978, after four years under Consent DecreeI, one sees from
inspection a shift in the distribution of standard deviationsto the left,'
consistent with the industry—wide trend. Themean and median of the 1978
distribution are 3.75 and 2.12 respectively, both still
significanly posi-
tive. Approximately 56% of all plants in 1978 continueto show significant
underutilization of blacks in trade and craft positions.Blacks have gained
in their representation in trade and craftpositions. However, one cannot
say that blacks have attained their "rightful place" after fouryears.
Figures 3a—e and 4a—e are histograms showing thegeographic break-
down of these overall distributions accordingto a geographic classification
34 / ofplants described by Richard L. Rowan in The Negro in theSteel Industry.
In both years, the Great Lakes Midwesternregion accounts for a substantial
proportion of the underutilization of blacks in craft jobs. Themean of the
Midwest distribution is 2.8 units and 2.0 unitsgreater than the mean of
the industry—wide distribution in 1974 and 1978respectively. However,
the mean of the Midwest distribution also shows the
greatest percentage
decrease over the four year period.
Further investigating the nature of underutilizationof blacks
in trade and craft positions, the analysis turnsto the investigation of
underutilization of blacks in the six broad classificationsof trade and
craft positions defined by the industry's Audit andReview Committee. These
craft categories are electrical, metalworks,machinist, moulder, bricklayer,






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Audit and Review Committee "Report on Minority and Female
Employee Utilization," Appendices B and D.—41—
these six ocuationa1
classifjcatjon6 in each of the fivegeographjca
regions.In most cases one observes
that black employment in theseclasses
for all regions increases.ere black emplonent ina category decreases
it does not decrease asquickly as does the white employment.As with trade
and craft eaplovees asa whole, blacks are notrepresented as expected in
the individual categories.For 1974, the standard deviationaway from ex-
pected black representation for eachclass of jobs is:














All categories in bothyears show significant underutilizationof blacks
in the industry. The
bricklayer grouping shows amovement away from the
expected black representationover these four years, whileelectricians
and millwrights show thelargest discrepancy betweeneected and actual
representation for blacks.
Exjenc Under Consent Decree I forNon—Trade and Craft Positions
Black representation in tradeand craft Positions showsmovement toward
the expected representation.
Still, by 1978, whether at theplant level, by
region or by specific craftgrouping, blacks were "underutilizednTrade
andcraftgoals were established by implementationcoittees in accordance—42—
with the terms of Consent Decree I, while the implementation ratio of 5O/
continued in effect. bat was the specific experience with regards to trans-
fers in the industry in the early years of the Decree, and how did employees
react to the incentives contained in the Decree? Thereas, the previous
analysis shows how transfer activity into trade and craft jobs has operated
over the first four years of the Decree, this section will concern itself
with transfer activity between non—trade and craft jobs.
In a report filed with the United States District Court in the
Northern District of Alabama, the Audit and Review Committee examines the
experience under the first two years of the Decree. Table 5 summarizes
this transfer activity.
Among males, transfer activity is relatively equal for all races
while white males make somewhat greater use of the voluntary return ex-
perience. Females, particularly black females, make relatively greater use
of the transfer experience; however, females still make up only 3.2 of the
P&M workforce.
In this same report, the Audit and Review Committee makesanother
point: although the transfer prvisions were designed to allowemployees
to select more desirable positions, the experience of the first twoyears
demonstrates that younger employees benefited most from thesystem. Transfer
systems, depending on the size and logistics of plants, are either two or
three stage processes. No matter what thesystem design, or the race or
sex of the employees, younger employees (those with less than fiveyears of
service) accounted for over half of all transfers as shown in Table 6.
Voluntary returners also were accounted for primarily byyounger employees.
Among the reasons employees gave for using the 45—day returnoption, the
most common was that the new position did not meet expectations interma ofTABLE 5





With Two—Step or Three—Step Bidding
Procedures
(All Inter—Unit Steps)
Source: Audit and ReviewCommittee, "Audit and Review Committee Reporton
Transfer and 45 Day Voluntary ReturnExperience Under Paragraph 7
of Consent Decree I," United States,et. al. v. Allegheny—Ludlum













































White Males 57% 55% 65%
Black Males 60% 54% 66%
SSA Males 62% 66% 61%
White Females 96% 87% 91%
Black Females 89% 93% 91%
SSA Females 75% 100% 100%
Source: Audit and Review Coinmittee,"Audit and Review Committee Report on
Transfer and 45 Day Voluntary Return Experience Under Paragraph 7
of Consent Decree I," United States, et. al. v. Allegheny—Ludlum
Inc., et. al., filed November 22, 1977, p. 6.—45—
(a) overall earnings, (b) incentive earnings, (c) shiftor turn assignments,
(d) temporary and permanent promotionalopportunities, or (e) general working
35/
conditions." Other reasons include using the option to callattention
to other grievances, to improve short—termearnings due to brief periods of
overtime opportunities in specific departments or to obtainbetter seasonal
working conditions. Based on these latter reasons, the Audit andReview
Committee altered the Decree, with the courts'approval, to prohibit an




1ale employees with service predating 1968 and femaleemployees in
the workforce on the effective date of Consent DecreeI were eligible for
the rate retention option. The Audit and ReviewCommittee's analysis of
the experience under this provision shows that 2555employees made use of
rate retention through March 31, 1977. The Committeeestimated that 13% of
all transferring employees benefited from therate retention provision.
The breakdown of employees using thisprovision by race and sex is shown
in Table 7.
Back Pay Tenders
The Consent Decree provides for a $250 minimumpayment to any
employee in the affected class and general guidelines forthe calculation
of actual payments. Table 8 summarizes theresults by the Audit and Review
Committee. The $30,940,000 fund was so allocatedto "affected class" em-
ployees, that an average payment of $660 was made. Theunions' contribu—
tion to the $30,940,000 fund was $4,420,089.—46—
TABLE 7






Source: Audit and Review Committee,"Audit and Review CommitteeReport on Rate Retention Transfer Experience "UnitedStates et. al.




















COMPANySRARESOF BACK PAYMENTS AND ELIGIBLEEMPLOYEES ==========
Number $250 For Service Corn an Eli ible % of Total Minimum Pre—1968 Share
Allegheny-Ludlurn 262 .56 65,500 107,764 $173,264 Armco 1,733 3.70 414,750 695,809 1,144,780 Bethlehem 11,082 23.64 2,47O,5 4,553,782 7,l4,216 Jones & Laughlin 2,634 5.62 582,500 986,770 1,738,828 National 2,787 5.95 547,5001,207,376 1,840,930 Republic 5,218 11.13 1,233,0002,127,454 3,443,622 u•s•Steel 18,860 40.24 4,229,5007,428,911 12,450,256 Wheeling-Pittsburgh 600 1.28 115,500 190,780 396,032 Youngs town 3,694 7.88 853,0001,488,546
TOTAL 46,870 100.00
$30,940,QQQ
Source: Audit and Review Committee, T1Audit and
Review Committee Report on BackPay Calculations," United States et. al. v.Allegheny—Ludlum, Inc., et. al., filed November 25, 1975,pp. 6—10.
TABLE 9






























Source: Audit and Review Comnuttee, "Audit and ReviewCommittee Report on Back Pay
Tenders," United States et. al. v. Allegheny—Ludlurn,Inc., et. al., filed
January 26, 1977, p. 15.—48—
Finail:, the Audit and Review Committee compiled statistics showinp
theacceptance rates of back pay tenders by company through December 1976.
Bethlehem Steel's experience shows the lowest acceptance rate of just under
90%, as opposed to approximately 97% for other companies. This rate was
attributable to that company's Lackawanna and Sparrow's Point plants, at
both of which private Title VII cases were pending, and at both of which
concerted efforts were made by the proponents of those suits to deter
37!
acceptance of tenders. The complete set of acceptance rates is shown in
Table 9.Indeed, a representative for the union familiar with the Consent
Decree's negotiation, expressed the view that those who were most vocal in
expressing disapproval with the terms of Consent Decree I were representa-
tives of organizations that would be deprived of fees from the "undermining
38/
of pending lawsuits."
In connection with the back pay and rate retention provisions of
the Consent Decree, an understanding of the nature of the earnings differ-
entials between occupations is necessary. No specific information on the
steel industry wage bill by occupation is available. Furthermore,job
classes and working pay scales in the basic labor agreement do not
apply consistently to given occupations in plants across thecountry.
However, certain facts about pay rates are revealing. Trade and craftjobs
often al1 in classes 14 to 18 of the basic agreement whichsets out a
39 /
totalof 34 classes. Not rarely, operative positions, in which black
representation exceeded 20% through the l970s, are classified above these
mid—range positions. Furthermore, many non—trade and craft jobs offer in—
40 / centivepay opportunities greater than those in trade and craft jobs.
Despite the focus of the Consent Decree on changing marked racial inequali-
ties in the occupational distribution, the industry minority—to—nonminority—49—
41/
ratio of earnings in 1973, adjusted forseniority, was 0.92. Tothedegree
that this ratio is not far fromunity, transfers will not necessarilypro-
vide strong economic incentives.By 1978, this seniority adjusted differ-
ential for the set of employees whoselength of service in the industry
42/ predatedthe effective date of theLecreestood at 0.96.
IV.ImpactsOutside of the Steel Indu
Outside of theimpactof the Steel Industry Consent Decree analyzed
here, the negotiation of this industry's equal employment opportunitypolicy
had an impact reaching well beyond the scope of the steelindustry. As
mentioned previously, the terms of the Steel Consent Decreewere included
as part of the terms of the industry's collective bargaining agreement.
Historically, the negotiations for the steel industry are visible andpat-
tern—setting. Most pronounced among such bargaining spillovers is the
relationship of basic steel with the aluminum industry. Jhatmakesthis
relationship particularly strong is the fact that the USWA is the principal
employee representative in both industries.
As a result of this historical pattern the terms of the basic steel
Consent Decree were incorporated practically verbatim within the framework of
the aluminum industry's collective bargaining agreement. Thelegal setting
of the aluminum industry's equal employment policy did not directly involve
government or court participation. The policy was the product of collective
bargaining. This fact was eventaully to have a significant impact on future
processes of the determination of equal employment policies. Specifically,
with the array of litigation associated wit United States v. Brian Weber
taking place in the setting of the aluminum industry, an opinion with a
great impact on the scope of collective bargaining was put forth by the—5 (j..
SupremeCourt. In this way, the Steel Industry Consent Decree was to have
an impact on industrial relations even beyond the implications for the
specific field of equal employment opportunity.
V. Conclusion
The process of negotiation that produced the Consent Decree must in
the end be evaluated against the alternative that had been available to
minority employees —litigationconducted on a plant—by—plant basis. The
major steel companies and the USWA were able in the negotiation process to
bring their expertise to the issue of seniority reform more directly than
might have been possible under a process carried out in court; moreover,
once responsible for the outcome, these key actors in this employment
setting, together with the participating government representatives,
were in a position of defending that outcome. Although litigation might
have allowed for greater direct particination of minorities, the Consent
Decree negotiation helped to limit the costs involved in reaching a settle-
ment. Furthermore, under the Decree, a mechanism for self—enforcement and
evaluation of progress that would not have been possible under the litiga-
tion of individual cases was instituted.
While the employment outcomes for the steel industry that might have
resulted from case—by—case litigation cannot be known, the experience of
the industry in the first four years of the Consent Decree I does reveal
two related points. Black representation in trade and craft jobs increased
over the period, particularly from 1974 to 1975, with an indication that
the increase was greater than pre—1974 employment trends would have
predicted. However, the 1978 black/white employment figures show that
extreme underutilization of blacks in these positions still exists. The-5-
lack of more rapid movement toward equality in theoccupational distribu-
tion could be due to earnings differentials that do notalways favor trade
and craft jobs or to a mechanism for changing the distribution thatis
ineffective in the post—1974, contracting steel industry (after thebrief
1973—74 upturn). To gauge the degree to which these or other factorsare
responsible requires the analysis of more detailed data.—52--
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